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Abstract. Passwords are widely used for user authentication and, de-
spite their weaknesses, will likely remain in use in the foreseeable future.
Human-generated passwords typically have a rich structure, which makes
them susceptible to guessing attacks. In this paper, we study the effective-
ness of guessing attacks based on Markov models. Our contributions are
two-fold. First, we propose a novel password cracker based on Markov
models, which builds upon and extends ideas used by Narayanan and
Shmatikov (CCS 2005). In extensive experiments we show that it can
crack up to 69% of passwords at 10 billion guesses, more than all prob-
abilistic password crackers we compared against. Second, we systemati-
cally analyze the idea that additional personal information about a user
helps in speeding up password guessing. We find that, on average and by
carefully choosing parameters, we can guess up to 5% more passwords,
especially when the number of attempts is low. Furthermore, we show
that the gain can go up to 30% for passwords that are actually based on
personal attributes. These passwords are clearly weaker and should be
avoided. Our cracker could be used by an organization to detect and re-
ject them. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically
study the relationship between chosen passwords and users’ personal in-
formation. We test and validate our results over a wide collection of
leaked password databases.
1 Introduction
Password-based authentication is the most widely used form of user authenti-
cation, both online and offline. Passwords will likely remain the predominant
form of authentication for the foreseeable future, due to a number of advantages:
passwords are highly portable, easy to understand for laypersons, and easy to
implement for the operators. Despite the weaknesses passwords have, they still
are and will be in use for some time. The reason can be found in [1], which lists
a large number of criteria that user authentication may fulfill, and measures the
quality of a large number of user authentication mechanisms. Alternative forms
of authentication can complement password, but have not been able, so far, to
provide a standalone alternative solution.
In this work, we concentrate on offline guessing attacks, in which the attacker
can make a number of guesses bounded only by the time and resources she is
willing to invest. While such attacks can be improved by increasing the speed
with which an attacker can make guesses (e.g., by using specialized hardware and
large computing resources [5, 4]), we concentrate here on techniques to reduce
the number of guesses required to crack a password. Hence, our approach reduces
the attack time independently of the available resources.
The optimal strategy for password cracking (both offline and online) is to
enumerate passwords in decreasing order of likelihood, i.e., trying more frequent
passwords first and less frequent passwords later. Moreover, human chosen pass-
words frequently have a rich structure which can be exploited to generate candi-
date guesses (e.g., using a dictionary and a set of concatenation rules).
Tools commonly used for password cracking, such as John the Ripper (JtR),
exploit regularities in the structure of password by applying mangling rules to an
existing dictionary of words (e.g., by replacing the letter a with @ or by appending
a number). Such approach, allows to generate new guesses from an existing
corpus of data, like a dictionary or a previously leaked password database. Recent
work [11][13] has shown ways to improve cracking performance by enumerating
guessed passwords based on their likelihood. These password crackers have been
shown to outperform JtR in certain conditions. The first insight of our work
will be to build upon and improve on the performance of these probabilistic
password crackers. Furthermore, while previously proposed password crackers
outperform JtR, they do not consider any user specific information. This means
that the guesses outputted by each of these tools are fixed and do not depend
upon additional information about the user.3
Common sense would suggest that guessing a password can be done more
efficiently when personal information about the victim is known. For example,
one could try to guess passwords that contain the victim’s date of birth or the
names of their siblings. However, this raises the question, how do we order (in a
probabilistic sense) what personal information to include in the guessing? While
guessing likely passwords, shall we include all the information about the victims
or only restrict the attack to a subset of that information? To the best of our
knowledge, these questions have not been throughly explored so far and, as we
will show, have a serious impact on the security of passwords. This is especially
true since the steadily increasing use of social networks gives attackers access
to a vast amount of public information about their victims for the purpose of
password cracking.
Paper organization: We review some basics on password guessing, commonly
used password guessers, as well as more related work in Section 2. In Section 3
we describe the Ordered Markov ENumerator (OMEN), and compare its per-
formance with other password guessers. Section 4 details the idea of exploiting
personal information in password guessing, some basic statistics about the data
we use, a detailed description of our algorithm and the results of our experiments.
We finally conclude this paper with a discussion of our findings.
3 JtR does some very limited guessing depending on the username
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2 Related Work
One of the main problems with passwords is that many users choose weak pass-
words. These passwords typically have a rich structure and thus can be guessed
much faster than with brute-force guessing attacks. Best practice mandates that
only the hash of a password is stored on the server, not the password, in order
to prevent leaking plain-text when the database is compromised. Furthermore,
additional salting is used to avoid pre-computation attacks. Let H be a hash
function and pwd the password, choose a random bitstring s ∈R {0, 1}16 as salt
and store the tuple (s, h = H(pwd || s)). In this work we mainly consider offline
guessing attacks, where an attacker is given access to the tuple (s, h), and tries
to recover the password pwd . The hash function is frequently designed for the
purpose of slowing down guessing attempts [9]. This means that the cracking
effort is strongly dominated by the computation of the hash function making the
cost of generating a new guess relatively small. Therefore, we evaluate all pass-
word crackers based on the number of attempts they make to correctly guess
passwords.
2.1 John the Ripper
John the Ripper (JtR) [7] is one of the most popular password crackers. It pro-
poses different methods to generate passwords: In dictionary mode, a dictionary
of words is provided as input, and the tool tests each one of them. Users can also
specify various mangling rules. When mangling rules are provided, JtR applies
each rule to each word in the input dictionary. In real attacks, the dictionary
mode using simple mangling rules works surprisingly well, especially when the
input dictionary is derived from large collections of leaked passwords. Similarly
to [3], we discover that for relatively small number of guesses (less than 108),
JtR in dictionary mode produces best results. However, we focus on attacks with
larger number of attempts, for which simple, non probabilistic approaches fall
short.
2.2 Password Guessing with Markov Models
Markov models have proven very useful for computer security in general and for
password security in particular. They are an effective tool to crack passwords [6],
and can likewise be used to accurately estimate the strength of new passwords [2].
The underlying idea is that adjacent letters in human-generated passwords
are not independently chosen, but follow certain regularities (e.g., the 2-gram
th is much more likely than tq and the letter e is very likely to follow th). In
an n-gram Markov model, one models the probability of the next character in a
string based on a prefix of length n − 1. Hence, for a given string c1, . . . , cm, a
Markov model estimates its probability as
P (c1, . . . , cm) = P (c1, . . . , cn−1) ·
m∏
i=n
P (ci|ci−n+1, . . . , ci−1). (1)
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For password cracking, one basically learns the initial probabilities P (c1, . . . , cn−1)
and the transition probabilities P (cn|c1, . . . , cn−1) from real-world data (which
should be as close as possible to the distribution we expect in the data that we
attack), and then enumerates passwords in order of descending probabilities as
estimated by the Markov model (according to Equation 1).
To make this attack efficient, we need to consider a number of details. First,
one usually has a limited dataset when learning the initial probabilities and tran-
sition probabilities. The limited data entails that one cannot learn frequencies
with arbitrarily high accuracy, i.e., data sparseness is a problem. The critical pa-
rameters are the size of the alphabet Σ and the parameter n, which determines
the length of the n-grams.
Second, one needs an algorithm that enumerates the passwords in the right
order. While it is easy to compute the probability for a given password, it is not
clear how to enumerate the passwords in decreasing probability. To overcome this
problem, [6] provides a method to enumerate all passwords that have probability
larger than a given threshold λ, but not necessarily in descending order. Hence,
all passwords that have a probability (approximately) higher than λ are produced
in output, where λ is an input parameter. This is sufficient for attacks based on
precomputation (rainbow tables), but not for “normal” guessing attacks where
guessing passwords in the correct order can drastically reduce guessing time.
Notably, an add-on to JtR has been released with an independent implemen-
tation of the algorithm presented in [6]. The implementation is available at [7].
In the evaluation section, we use this implementation as a comparison (and refer
to as JtR-markov).
JtR Incremental mode (JtR-inc) [7]: The incrementalmode tries passwords
based on a (modified) 3-gram Markov model. Specifically, JtR-inc computes not
only the probability of each 3-gram but also the probability that this particular
3-grams appears at certain indices. In this way, this attack takes into account
the structure of the password (e.g., upper case appears usually at the front
while numbers at the end). However, two key differences are to note: first, as for
Narayanan and al. algorithm, the guesses are not generated in the true proba-
bility order and second, the Markov chain is modified so that it can cover the
entire keyspace.
2.3 Probabilistic Grammars-based Schemes
Probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) schemes make the assumption that
password structures have different probabilities [11]. In other words, some struc-
tures, such as passwords composed of 6 letters followed by 2 digits, are more
frequent than others. The main idea of these schemes is therefore to extract the
most frequent structures, and use them to generate password candidates.
More precisely, in the training phase, different structures are extracted from
lists of real-world passwords, where each structure indicates the positions of lower
and uppercase letters, numerical, and special characters, as well as the associated
probabilities. In the attack phase (or password generation phase), an algorithm
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outputs the possible structures for the grammar with decreasing probabilities.
From this output, which describes positions of the four classes of characters,
password guesses are generated as follows: Numerical and special characters
are substituted by those that have been observed in the training phase and
in decreasing order of probability, and letters are substituted with appropriate
words from a dictionary. This gives the final password candidate list.
3 OMEN: An Improved Markov Model Based Password
Cracker
In this section we present a more efficient implementation of password enumer-
ation based on Markov models, which is the first contribution of our work. Our
implementation improves previous work based on Markov models by Narayanan
et al. [6] and JtR [7]. Note that the indexing algorithm presented by Narayanan
et al. [6] combines two ideas: first, it uses Markov models to index only passwords
that have high probability, and second, it utilizes a hand-crafted finite automata
to accept only passwords of a specific form (e.g., eight letters followed by a digit).
Our algorithm is solely based on Markov models to create guesses. However, it
could be combined with similar ideas as well.
3.1 An Improved Enumeration Algorithm
Narayanan et al.’s indexing algorithm [6] has the disadvantage of not outputting
passwords in order of decreasing probability, however, guessing passwords in
the right order can substantially speed up password guessing (see the example
in Section 3.2). We developed an algorithm, the Ordered Markov ENumerator
(OMEN), to enumerate passwords with (approximately) decreasing probabilities.
On a high level, our algorithm discretizes all probabilities into a number of
bins, and iterates over all those bins in order of decreasing likelihood. For each
bin, it finds all passwords that match the probability associated with this bin
and outputs them. More precisely, we first take the logarithm of all n-gram prob-
abilities, and discretize them into levels (denoted η) similarly to Narayanan et
al. [6], according to the formula lvl i = round (log(c1 · probi + c2)) , where c1 and
c2 are chosen such that the most frequent n-grams get a level of 0 and that
n-grams that did not appear in the training are still assigned a small probability.
Note that levels are negative, and we adjusted the parameters to get 10 different
levels, i.e., the levels can take values 0,−1, . . . ,−9. The number of levels influ-
ences both the accuracy of the algorithm as well as the runtime: more levels
means better accuracy, but increased runtime.
For a specific length ℓ and level η, enumPwd(η, ℓ) proceeds as follows:
1. It identifies all vectors a = (a2, . . . , al) of length ℓ − 1 (when using 3-grams
we need ℓ − 2 transition probabilities and 1 initial probability to determine
the probability for a string of length ℓ), such that each entry ai is an integer
in the range [0,−9], and the sum of all elements is η.
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Algorithm 1 Enumerating passwords for level η and length ℓ (here for ℓ = 4).4
function enumPwd(η, ℓ)
1. for each vector (ai)2≤i≤ℓ with
∑
i
ai = η
and for each x1x2 ∈ Σ
2 with L(x1x2) = a2
and for each x3 ∈ Σ with L(x3 | x1x2) = a3
and for each x4 ∈ Σ with L(x4 | x2x3) = a4:
(a) output x1x2x3x4
2. For each such vector a, it selects all 2-grams x1x2 whose probabilities match
level a2. For each of these 2-grams, it iterates over all x3 such that the 3-gram
x1x2x3 has level a3. Next, for each of these 3-grams, it iterates over all x4
such that the 3-gram x2x3x4 has level a4, and so on, until the desired length
is reached. In the end, this process outputs a set of candidate passwords of
length ℓ and level (or “strength”) η.
A more formal description is presented in Algorithm 1. It describes the algo-
rithm for ℓ = 4. However, the extension to larger ℓ is straightforward.
Example: We illustrate the algorithm with a brief example. For simplicity, we
consider passwords of length ℓ = 3 over a small alphabet Σ = {a, b}, where the
initial probabilities have levels
L(aa) = 0, L(ab) = −1,
L(ba) = −1, L(bb) = 0,
and transitions have levels
L(a|aa) = −1 L(b|aa) = −1
L(a|ab) = 0 L(b|ab) = −2
L(a|ba) = −1 L(b|ba) = −1
L(a|bb) = 0 L(b|bb) = −2.
– Starting with level η = 0 gives the vector (0, 0), which matches to the pass-
word bba only (the prefix “aa” matches the level 0, but there is no matching
transition with level 0).
– Level η = −1 gives the vector (−1, 0), which yields aba (the prefix “ba” has
no matching transition for level 0), as well as the vector (0,−1), which yields
aaa and aab.
– Level η = −2 gives three vectors: (−2, 0) yields no output (because no initial
probability matches the level −2), (−1,−1) yields baa and bab, and (0,−2)
yields bba.
– and so one for all remaining levels.
The selection of ℓ (i.e. the length of the password to be guessed) is challenging,
as the frequency with which a password length appears in the training data
4 Here L(xy) and L(z|xy) stand for the level of initial and transition probabilities,
respectively.
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is not a good indicator of how often a specific length should be guessed. For
example, assume that are as many passwords of length 7 and of length 8, then
the success probability of passwords of length 7 is larger as the search-space is
smaller. Hence, passwords of length 7 should be guessed first. Therefore, we use
an adaptive algorithm that keeps track of the success ratio of each length and
schedules more passwords to guess for those lengths that were more effective.
More precisely, our adaptive password scheduling algorithm works as follows:
1. For all n length values of ℓ (we consider lengths from 3 to 20, i.e. n =
17), execute enumPwd(0, ℓ) and compute the success probability spℓ,0. This
probability is computed as the ratio of successfully guessed passwords over
the number of generated password guesses of length ℓ.
2. Build a list L of size n, ordered by the success probabilities, where each
element is a triple (sp, level , length). (The first element L[0] denotes the
element with the largest success probability.)
3. Select the length with the highest success probability, i.e., the first element
L[0] = (sp0, level0, length0) and remove it from the list.
4. Run enumPwd(level0−1, length0), compute the new success probability sp
∗,
and add the new element (sp∗, level0 − 1, length0) to L.
5. Sort L and go to Step 3 until L is empty or enough guesses have been made.
3.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present a comparison between our improved Markov model
password cracker and previous state-of-the-art solutions.
Datasets: We evaluate the performance of our password guesser on multiple
datasets. One of the largest lists currently publicly available is the RockYou
list (RY), consisting of 32.6 million passwords that were obtained by an SQL
injection attack in 2009. The passwords were leaked in clear, all further infor-
mation was stripped from the list before it was leaked to the public. This list
has two advantages: first, its large size gives well-trained Markov models; second,
it was collected via an SQL injection attack therefore affecting all the users of
the compromised service. We split the RockYou list into two subsets: a training
set (RY-t) of 30 million and a testing set (RY-e) of the remaining 2.6 million
passwords.
The MySpace list (MS) contains about 50 000 passwords (different versions
with different sizes exist, most likely caused by different sanitation or leaked
from the servers at different points in time). The passwords were obtained in
2006 by a phishing attack. As before, we split the list in a training set (MS-t) of
30 000 and a testing set (MS-e) of the remaining 20 000 passwords.
The Facebook list (FB) was posted on the pastebin.com website5 in 2011.
This dataset contains both Facebook passwords and associated email addresses.
It is unknown how the data was obtained by the hacker, but most probably was
collected via a phishing attack. Finally, we used a list of 60 000 email addresses
5 http://pastebin.com/
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and passwords leaked by the group LulzSec (we call this list LZ). The list was
publicly released in June 2011 via Twitter6.
We complemented the Facebook list by collecting the public information
associated to the Facebook profiles connected to the email addresses. For each
profile, we collected the public attributes, which include: first/last name; location;
date of birth; friends names; siblings names; education/work names.
Ethical Considerations: Leaked password databases have been used in a num-
ber of studies on passwords [11, 10, 2]. Studying databases of leaked password
has arguably helped the understanding of users real world password practices.
The information we used in our study was already available to the public.
Results: In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our password guesser
OMEN, and compare it with other password guessers on different datasets. We
discover that OMEN has consistently better performance compared to previously
proposed algorithms. For the experiments, we trained OMEN using the RockYou
training set RY-t (or MS-t in one experiment), and evaluated it on the sets RY-e,
MS (or MS-e when training on MS-t), and FB. Table 1 provides a summary of
the results. The table can also be used as a comparison of all the previously
proposed password crackers.
Algorithm Training Set
Testing Set
RY-e MS-e FB
Omen
RY-t (1010) 69% 66% 64%
RY-t 60% 54% 54%
MS-t (0.8 ∗ 1010) 64% 68% 49%
PCFG [11] MS-t (0.8 ∗ 1010) 37% 53% 29%
JtR-Markov [6]
RY-t (1010) 64% 60% 61%
RY-t 53% 40% 50%
JtR-Inc RY-t 44% 37% 40%
Table 1: Summary table indicating the percentage of cracked passwords for 1
billion guesses (or 10 billion when specified).
OMEN vs JtR’s Markov Mode: Figure 1a shows the comparison of OMEN
and the Markov mode of JtR. JtR’s Markov mode implements the password
indexing function by Narayanan et al. [6]. Both models are trained on a list of
passwords (*-t). Then, given a target number of guesses T (here 1 billion), we
computed the corresponding level (η) to output T passwords. The curve shows
the dramatic improvement in cracking speed given by our improved ordering of
the password guesses. In fact, JtR-Markov outputs guesses in no particular order
which implies that likely passwords can appear “randomly” late in the guesses.
This behaviour leads to the near-linear curves shown in Figure 1a. One may ask
whether JtR-Markov would surpass OMEN after the point T ; the answer is no
as the results do not extend linearly beyond the point T ; and larger values of
T lead to a flatter curve. To demonstrate this claim, we performed the same
6 https://twitter.com/#!/LulzSec/status/81327464156119040
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Fig. 1: (a) Comparing OMEN with the JtR Markov mode, 1B guesses. (b) OMEN
Vs JtR Markov mode, 10 billion guesses
experiment with T equals to 10 billion guesses (instead of 1 billion). Figure 1b
shows how the linear curve becomes flatter.
To show the generality of our approach, we compare the cracking perfor-
mance on three different datasets:RY, FB and MS. The ordering advantage al-
lows OMEN to crack more than 40% of passwords (independently of the dataset)
in the first 90m guesses while JtR-Markov cracker needs at least eight times as
many guesses to reach the same goal.
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Fig. 2: Comparing OMEN to the PCFG guesser (a) and to JtR incremental
mode(b).
OMEN vs PCFG: Figure 2a compares our guesser with the PCFG password
guesser of Weir et al. [11], based on the code available in [8]. We run it using the
configuration as described in the paper and using the dictionary dict-0294 [12].
In this experiment we trained on the MySpace dataset, since the public version
of PCFG seemed unable to correctly train on the larger RockYou dataset due
to a memory bug.
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OMEN outperforms the PCFG guesser, except when testing on the MyS-
pace list, where PCFG produces slightly better guesses for the first 100 million
attempts. However, OMEN produces better guesses after 100 million and out-
performs PCFG by around 10% at 8 billion guesses. We believe the reason is
that the grammar for PCFG is trained on a subset of the MySpace list, which
is better adapted to guessing the MySpace list, whereas the MySpace list is too
small to meaningfully train Markov models. Note that PCFG mostly plateaus
after 0.5 billion guesses and results hardly improve any more, whereas OMEN
still produces noticeable progress. For the other testing sets, however, OMEN
produces better guesses almost from the beginning.
OMEN vs JtR’s Incremental Mode: We also compare OMEN to JtR in in-
cremental mode (Figure 2b). Similarly to the previous experiments, both crack-
ers were trained on the RockYou training set of 30 million passwords. It appears
clear that the incremental mode in JtR produces worse guesses than OMEN.
Notably, it also produces worse guesses than any other cracker tested.
4 Personal Information and Password Guessing
The results of the previous section show that a significant fraction of passwords
can be guessed with a (relatively) moderate number of attempts, compared to
the entire possible search space. However, most techniques adopt a coarse grained
approach that relies on a generic probability distribution, which by definition,
does not depend on the password being guessed. Intuitively, exploiting personal
information in the password cracking process may enhance the success ratio.
Surpassingly, such possibility has not been extensively studied.
While a multitude of personal information can be used, we focus on a realistic
scenario where these information can easily be extracted from a public source.
For instance, an attacker armed with his victim email address, can gather her
social network profile and use the collected information to guess her password.
Such information includes:
– Information related to the user’s name, such as first name, last name, user-
name;
– Social relations such as friends’ and family members’ names;
– Interests such as hobbies, favorite movies, etc;
– Location information like the place of residence;
In the next sections, we explore the relationship between such information,
referred to as hint in the rest of this paper, and passwords, as well as its effect
on password cracking.
4.1 Similarity between Passwords and Personal Information
To asses whether social information can be exploited to improve password crack-
ing, we quantify the correlation between passwords and personal information. We
10
use two different similarity metrics to capture different aspects of the potential
overlap.
Longest common substring (LCSS): The LCSS of two strings is the longest
string that is a substring of both strings. For example, the LCSS of the two
strings abcabc and abcba is abc, and the LCSS of abcabc.
(Modified) Jaccard similarity (JS): The Jaccard similarity index compares
similarity of two sets. For two sets X and Y , the Jaccard index is J(X,Y ) :=
|X∩Y |
|X∪Y | . It is a similarity measure on sets, not on strings. However, we extract
the n-grams from a string and apply the JS function to the sets of n-grams.
There is one drawback of this measure that does not match our application,
namely that appending unrelated information to the hint (which degrades the
“real” usefulness only for large appended text) rapidly decreases the JS value.
Therefore, we use a “modified JS” defined as follows: Given a password P and
a hint H , and denoting the set of 3-grams that appear in P and H with P3g
and H3g, respectively, we define J
∗
3g(P,H) :=
|P3g∩H3g |
|P3g |
. Figure 3 displays the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the JS between passwords and per-
sonal information for FB and LZ datasets. For each password of the Facebook
dataset, we compute the JS with each of its corresponding personal attribute.
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Fig. 3: CDF of Jaccard similarity
The lowest (green) plot (FB Max) dis-
plays the CDF of the maximum of these
values. It basically shows that about 35%
of Facebook passwords are somewhat cor-
related with one of their user’s attributes.
Note that any non-zero similarity means
that at least one 3-gram is shared, which
already is a substantial overlap. The cor-
relation becomes stronger for about 10%
of users. The grey (FB Username) and
black (LZ Username) curves display the
CDF of the similarity between passwords
and UserNames for the FB and LZ
datasets, respectively. They both show
similar shape, although surprisingly Face-
book passwords seem to be more corre-
lated to UserNames than LZ passwords. In both datasets, about 10% of pass-
words seem to be highly correlated with the UserNames attribute.
Table 2 goes into more details and summarizes similarity measures between
different attributes and the respective passwords of the FB datasets. As shown
by Figure 3, more than 80% of passwords have little similarity with personal
information attributes. This explains the small similarity values in column JS
and LCSS, that correspond to averages of the similarities over the whole dataset
(since many similarities are equal to zero, the resulting averages have pretty low
values). For this reason, we order the passwords according to their similarity
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Attribute JS JS(5%) LCSS LCSS(5%) Len
FirstName 0.02 0.31 0.93 4.34 5.84
LastName 0.01 0.24 0.71 3.55 6
Username 0.07 0.58 1.48 6.31 10.53
Friends 0.06 0.30 1.54 4.15 147.28
Edu/Work 0.02 0.23 1.20 3.5 40.93
Contacts 0.06 0.63 1.44 6.55 17.67
Location 0.01 0.13 1.07 2.94 25.70
Birthday 0.04 0.5 0.87 4 6.84
Siblings 0.04 0.36 1.27 4.96 94.71
Table 2: Mean similarity between passwords and personal information (FB
dataset).
values for the different attributes. We then present, in the columns JS(5%) and
LCSS(5%), the average similarity of the top 5% for each attributes.
First we notice how attributes such as UserNames, FirstName andBirthday
seem to substantially overlap with the passwords. For instance, for the top 5%
users, UserNames and Birthday share half of the n-grams with the password
and have more than 4 and 6.4 common substring with it respectively. Further-
more, we notice that long attributes such as Friends or Education and Work
(on average 150 characters long and 50, respectively) have a high value of LCSS.
Finally, the LCSS(5%) results show that the average LCSS value is around 3
which sustains the usage of a 3-grams model (rather than 2-grams or 4-grams).
In Section 4.2 we will explore how to incorporate these findings to robustly
increase the performance of OMEN.
Password Creation Policies and Usernames One surprising fact high-
lighted by the data in the previous section is that usernames and passwords are
very similar in a small, yet significant, fraction of the cases. This fact prompted
us to study this specific aspect of password policies in depth, reader may refer
to Appendix A for more details. The results are worrisome: out of 48 tested
sites, 27 allowed identical username and password, including major sites such as
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, and only 4 sites required more than one char-
acter difference between the two. This could lead to highly effective guessing
attack.
4.2 OMEN+: Improving OMEN Performance with Personal
Information
In Section 4.1 we showed that users’ personal information and passwords can
be correlated. However, it is not clear how to use such information when guess-
ing passwords especially that some information may have a negatively impact
on the performance. Let us illustrate this possibility with an example: assume
that we possess extensive information about a victim. This information may
include name, date of birth, location information, family member names, etc. In-
tuitively, this information should increase the performance of a password cracker.
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For example, we could generate a password guess with the name of a sibling con-
catenated with their year of birth. However, in order to increase the (overall)
performance, one must still order password guesses in decreasing probability.
Otherwise, the integration of additional information can decrease effectiveness.
To show this, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the attacker is only al-
lowed one guess. The same argument can be extended to any number of guesses.
The attacker should use some personal information for the one guess only if the
probability of this password is higher than the most frequent “generic” password,
say 123456. Assuming that no user specific password is, on average, more fre-
quent than 123456, then, by including personal information, the attacker would
decrease her chances of success for the single guess.
Boosting Algorithm: It is challenging to decide how to use the additional
personal information. In fact, only certain parts of this data overlap with the
password. In a dictionary-based attack, we need to decide which substring(s)
should be added to the attack dictionary, and choosing the wrong ones one could
decrease performance. With Markov models, however, the situation is easier, as
n-grams are a canonical target. By increasing (conditional) probabilities of im-
portant n-grams (i.e. n-grams that are contained in hints), we can increase the
probability of passwords that are related to them, and thus improve OMEN’s
performance. Our boosting algorithm takes as input a parameter α > 1 (see
Section 4.2 on how this parameter is chosen), a hint h, and a Markov model con-
sisting of the initial probabilities p(xy) and the conditional probabilities p(z|xy),
and outputs modified conditional probabilities p∗(z|xy). Let us assume we have
a list of N passwords pwd1, . . . , pwdN , and for each password pwdi we have some
additional information hinti, which may or may not help us in guessing the pass-
word. We want to automatically and efficiently determine if a specific set of hints
is useful or not, and how strongly each of the hints should be weighted. Note
that since hints are password-specific, trying all possible combinations would be
too computationally expensive. Our algorithm works as follows7:
1. For each pair pwdi, hinti, two sets are defined: Si is the set of 3-grams that
appear in both the password and the hint and Ti is the set of 3-grams from
pwdi such that hinti has a 3-gram that shares the first two letters, but not
the third. For instance, if pwdi = password and hinti = passabcd then
Si = {pas, ass} and Ti = {ssw}.
2. For each 3-gram xyz in Si, we set the conditional probability
p∗(z|xy) := α · p(z|xy)
for a given parameter α. Considering the previous example, we boost the 3-
grams pas and ass, as follows: p∗(s|pa) := α · p(s|pa); p∗(s|as) := α · p(s|as)
By modifying a conditional probability from pˆ to α · pˆ we distribute a prob-
ability mass of (α − 1)pˆ that we need to subtract at another place. The
probability pˆ is (in practice) much smaller than 1 (we use an alphabet
7 To ease presentation, we only describe the estimation algorithm for 3-grams. The
generalization to n-grams is straightforward.
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size of |Σ| = 72), so 1 − pˆ ≈ 1. Consequently, if we multiply all remain-
ing (conditional) probabilities except pˆ with (1 − αpˆ), they sum up to ap-
proximately 1 again (using the approximation simplifies the calculations):
(1 − αpˆ) · (
∑
i6=z p(i|xy)) + αpˆ ≈ (1 − pˆα) · 1 + αpˆ = 1. Writing si := |Si|
and ti := |Ti| for the sizes of the two sets, the overall effect on password
probabilities is
p∗pwdi =
∏
i∈(pwdi)3g
pi ≈ α
si(1− pˆα)ti · poldpwdi
where p∗pwdi is the “new” probability after boosting the n-grams, and p
old
pwdi
is the “old” probability before boosting.
Estimating Boosting Parameters The section describes how the boosting
parameter α of each hinti is computed. Recall that OMEN outputs password
guesses in descending order of their (estimated) probabilities. Let f denote the
function that gives the estimated probabilities x = f(y) for the y-th guess that
OMEN outputs. This function can simply be computed by running OMEN and
printing the probability estimation of the current password. The inverse function
y = f−1(x) gives the number of guesses OMEN needs to output before reach-
ing passwords with a certain (estimated) probability. This function is shown
in Figure 4 on a double logarithmic scale. In order to simplify the subsequent
calculations, we approximate this function as f−1(x) ≈ x−1.5.
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Fig. 4: Relation between (estimated)
password probability and the posi-
tion when it is guessed (line), and
the approximation we use (dashed-
line), on double-logarithmic scale.
α ln(α) boosted
email 1.6 0.5 0(*)
userName 2 0.7 1
firstName 2.3 0.8 1
lastName 1.5 0.4 0
birthday 5 1.6 2
location 1.7 0.5 1
contact 1.5 0.4 0
eduWork 1.1 0.1 0
friends 1.4 0.3 0
siblings 1.7 0.5 1
Table 3: The estimated values of α
and the boosting parameters for the
attributes we considered.
The estimated number of guesses which is required to crack all passwords
pwd1, . . . , pwdN is consequently defined by S =
1
N
∑
i=1,...,N f
−1(ppwdi).Therefore,
for a given hinti, the value αi to use to boost this hint is the value of α that
minimizes the following function: S∗ = 1
N
∑
i=1,...,N(p
∗
pwdi
)−1.5.
The following section presents the optimal values of α for different hints.
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Fig. 6: Estimated influence of the parameter α applied on the attribute: username
(a), eduWork (b) and birthday (c). The x-axis shows α and the y axis the expected
number of guesses.
4.3 Evaluation
Boosting Parameter Estimation We use the techniques described in the
previous section to estimate the boosting parameter α for the different hints.
For each hint, we compute the sum S∗ for different values of α, and select the
value that minimizes it. We illustrate the results with three examples:
First Name: Figure 6a shows S∗ as a function of α for the attribute first name.
The minimum is around α = 2.3, which yields a boosting parameter of 1.
EduWork: Figure 6b shows S∗ as a function of α for the attribute eduWork,
which is an identifier that contains the persons’ education and occupancy. It has
a very small decrease in the beginning, with a minimum around α = 1.2, but
the overall differences are small and the remainder of the graph is monotonically
increasing. The boosting parameter is 0.1, which is rounded to 0.
Birthday: Figure 6c shows S∗ as a function of α for the birthday attribute. Note
that our dataset only contains a small number of profiles with that attribute,
so the result might not be necessarily meaningful. Overall, there were only 7
profiles where the birthday attribute have an effect, and for two of them the
effect is positive. These two have enough effect to lead to a great advantage in
using the attribute. Overall, we limited the maximal parameter considered to 5.
Finally, we dropped the attribute email. Although it gives an alpha of 1.6
since the username is contained in email and achieves better results. All boosting
parameters are summarized in Table 5.
OMEN+ Performance Once we have estimated the values of the parameters
αi for each hinti, we run OMEN+ on the Facebook (FB) list, consisting of 3140
passwords together with publicly available information about the users. The re-
sults are presented in Figure 7a. As expected, by including personal information
in the Markov model, OMEN+ is able to guess more passwords in absolute terms.
We have also conducted different experiments with other values αi to test the
effectiveness of our estimation code. We confirmed that, when using different val-
ues αi, the cracking performance either remains the same or slightly decreases.
The two lower curves in the figure show the performance of OMEN+ over all
passwords with and without using personal attributes. Using personal informa-
tion can increase the guessed passwords up to 5% (for lower number of guesses
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of up to 100 million), and around 3% at 1 billion guesses. The limited perfor-
mance gain is partially explained by the fact that, as shown in Section 4.1, only
a small proportion of passwords are based on personal information. The 2 curves
in the upper part of the figure display the performance of OMEN+ over the top
5% passwords that are the most correlated with their personal attributes. The
achieved performance is much better: About 82% of the passwords are cracked
by using usernames only, and more than 88% by using all considered personal
attributes. This result is very promising.Figure 7b shows a similar experiment
performed on the LZ list (60000 passwords). We only had access to the local-part
(i.e., the username) of the email associated to each password. Even though the
information in this case was more limited, we realized similar gains compared to
the previous test on the more extensive FB data.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work we have first presented an efficient password guesser (OMEN) based
on Markov models, which outperforms all publicly available password guessers.
For common password lists we found that we can guess almost 70% of the pass-
words with 10 billion guesses. Subsequently, in our second contribution, we tested
if additional personal information about a user can help us to better guess pass-
words. We found that some attributes indeed help, and we showed how OMEN+
can efficiently leverage this information. We summarize some of the key insights:
– Our work shows that Markov Model have even better potential than previ-
ously thought [6], as we could make them guessing “in order”, which leads to
the improvements shown in Figures 1a and 1b.
– We find, with our preliminary and simple experiments, that we can guess up
to 5% more passwords. However this percentage is a lower bound since we
had access to only a limited number of personal information and attributes.
Furthermore, we show that the gain can go up to 30% for passwords that
are actually based on personal attributes. This result clearly shows that
passwords based on personal information are weaker and should be avoided.
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Appendix A: Password creation policies
One surprising fact highlighted by the data in the previous section is that user-
names and passwords are very similar in a small, yet significant, fraction of the
cases. Common sense mandates that a password should not be too similar to the
corresponding username, because the username is almost always available to the
attacker in a guessing attack.
This fact prompted us to study this specific aspect of password policies in
more detail. We conducted a brief test8 across 48 popular international sites
(from the Alexa Top 500 list), to see how they handle similarities between the
username and the password (See Table 4).
These sites have different demands for security, ranging from relatively low
security demands (Facebook, Twitter), to high security demands (Ebay, PayPal).
We did not rely on the stated password policies, but manually created an account
on each site. We created a random but plausible username that was not yet used
with the service, and tried to register an account. We initially tried to use the
username as the password, and if that failed we tried subsequent modifications
until we succeeded. The results are worrisome, but not too surprising. Out of
48 sites tested, 27 allowed identical usernames and passwords, including major
sites such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, and only 4 sites required more
than one character difference between the two. This could lead to highly effective
guessing, for example in the Lulzsec-dataset, we found that 5% of the accounts
had strongly overlapping usernames and passwords.
8 This survey is neither representative nor complete, but the results are clear enough
to show that the problem exists on a large scale.
Account Username Password
Same
accepted?
Min. Diff.
(# Chars) Comments
Google berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Facebook berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Twitter berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Baidu berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Ebay berkusrnfe03 BerkUsrnfe14 no 2 Username cannot be same as
email; requires capitals.
Amazon berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Paypal berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Yahoo berkusrnfe02@yahoo.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Wikipedia berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Windows Live berkusrnfe02@hotmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
QQ.com berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
LinkedIn berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Taobao berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Sina.cn.com berkusrnfe02@yahoo.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
MSN berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
WordPress berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Yandex berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
163.com berkusrnfe02@163.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Mail.ru berkusrnfe02@Mail.ru berkusrnfe03 no 1
Weibo berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrenfe02 no 0
Tumblr berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Apple berkusrnfe02 BerkUsrnfe02 no 0 Password at least 1 capi-
tal, 1 number, no 3 consecu-
tive identical characters, not
same as account, at least 8
char.
IMDB berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Craigslist berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe03 no 1
Sohu berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
FC2 berkusrnfe02 berksurnfe03 no 3 The password cannot con-
tain any five (5) consecutive
characters of your e-mail ad-
dress.
Tudou berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Ask berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
iFeng berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
Youku berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Tmall berkusrnfe02 berksurnfe03 no 3
Imgur berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Mediafire berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
CNN berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Adobe berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Conduit berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
odnoklassniki.ru/ berksrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
AOL berkusrnfe02 beruksrnef03 no 5
The Pirate Bay berkusrn berkusrn yes 0 Username length limit.
ESPN berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Alibaba berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Dailymotion berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Chinaz berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
AVG berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Ameblo berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe03 no 1
GoDaddy berkusrnfe02 berkusrnfe02 yes 0
StackOverflow berkusrnfe02 BerkUsrnfe03 no 1 Needs capitals or special
characters.
4shared berkusrnfe02@gmail.com berkusrnfe02 yes 0
Table 4: Detailed results from a small survey on 48 large sites concerning their
password policies.
